Jurisdiction of HLURB vis-a-vis that of the trial court

Political Law, Administrative Law


Arranza vs. BF Homes [G.R. No. 131683. June 19, 2000]

The boom in the real estate business all over the country resulted in more litigation between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers with the issue of the jurisdiction of the NHA or the HLURB over such controversies as against that of regular courts. In the cases that reached this Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.

Notably, in Antipolo Really Corporation v. National Housing Authority one of the issues raised by the homeowners was the failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision in accordance with its undertakings under the contract to sell. Such undertakings include providing the subdivision with concrete curbs and gutters, underground drainage system, asphalt paved roads, independent water system, electrical installation with concrete posts, landscaping and concrete sidewalks, developed park or amphitheater and 24-hour security guard service. The Court held that the complaint filed by the homeowners was within the jurisdiction of the NHA.

Similarly, in Alcasid v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the HLURB, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the complaint of lot buyers for specific performance of alleged contractual and statutory obligations of the defendants, to wit, the execution of contracts of sale in favor of the plaintiffs and the introduction in the disputed property of the necessary facilities such as asphalting and street lights.

In the case at bar, petitioners' complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and security. Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint.

The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction…The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights.


Osea vs. Ambrosio [G.R. No. 162774. April 7, 2006]

This Court has thus consistently held that complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Under the circumstances attendant to the case, the HLURB has the expertise to determine the basic technical issue of whether the alleged deviations from the building plans and the technical specifications affect the soundness and structural strength of the house.


Ridgewood vs. Belaos [G.R. No. 166751. June 8, 2006]

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 provides for the jurisdiction of HLURB (then National Housing Authority).

The Court held in Roxas v. Court of Appeals that the mere relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344. The HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

The complaint filed by respondent against petitioner was one for damages. It prayed for the payment of moral, actual and exemplary damages by reason of petitioner's malicious encashment of the checks even after the rescission of the contract to sell between them. Respondent claimed that because of petitioner's malicious and fraudulent acts, he suffered humiliation and embarrassment in several banks, causing him to lose his credibility and good standing among his colleagues. Such action falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts, not the HLURB.